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I. Canada and Communitarianism 
In 1992, Charles Taylor received the Léon Gérin prize for "his extraordinary 
contribution to the civic and intellectual life of Québec." His intellectual contributions had 
been wide-ranging – among other achievements, a professorship at McGill University, 
impressive contributions to moral philosophy, the philosophy of language, social science, 
political theory, the history of ancient and modern philosophy, and over a dozen book 
publications. His civic contribution was mostly comprised of his active engagement in the 
constitutional debate in Canada about the recognition of Québec as a "distinctive society 
within the federation, reformed in 1982" and the adoption of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights. His proposal, expressed, for example, in his rejections of both the 1990 Meech 
Lake accord and the 1995 Québec independence referendum, was of the "recognition" of 
Québec’s distinctiveness, and an asymmetrical and decentralized form of federalism. 
Québec’s exit would imply a shock to something characteristically Canadian, which he 
called "deep diversity."1  
Although, in principle, communitarianism is concerned with all kinds of communities, 
in practice, Canada has probably been the most fertile land for these ideas to develop.  
 
1 For Charles Taylor’s political engagements, see Stephen Mulhall’s "Articulating the 
Horizons of Liberalism: Taylor’s Political Philosophy", in Charles Taylor, ed. Ruth Abbey 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 113-22. 
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Taylor is generally placed among the four horsemen of liberalism’s "communitarian" 
critics,2 and one more of the "communitarians" who deny the label. One point which 
distinguishes him from other recent critics of liberalism is his suggestion that ontological 
questions do not directly play into the formation of a certain kind of government or a 
particular kind of politics; so that contest between the priority of the right or the good, 
which typically serves as the point of demarcation between liberals and 
"communitarians", respectively, is not a test applicable to Taylor in the usual sense. We 
may get a picture of his political outlook with two considerations.  
First, he does not find that liberalism is necessarily wrong in its core respects, 
although it needs ancillary clarifications. "There is a form of the politics of equal respect", 
Taylor notes, "as enshrined in a liberalism of rights, that is inhospitable to difference, 
because (a) it insists on uniform application of the rules defining these rights, without 
exception, and (b) it is suspicious of collective goals." 3 He rejects this variant of liberalism 
on both counts, and ancillary clarification would show both how liberalism does not 
uniformly apply rights, and that it should not be suspicious of collective goals. 
Secondly, and on the latter point of collective goals, Taylor is of the mind that the 
goods captured by a communal analysis – that is, which take some overarching and 
agreed upon communal norms as the criteria by which something is evaluated as good or 
bad – are not the only goods which should be taken into account. We can get some clarity 
on Taylor’s suspicion of the suspiciousness of collective goals when he writes: 
A society with strong collective goals can be liberal, on this view, provided it is also 
capable of respecting diversity, especially when dealing with those who do not share its 
common goals; and provided it can offer adequate safeguards for fundamental rights. 
There will undoubtedly be tensions and difficulties in pursuing these objectives together, 
but such a pursuit is not impossible, and the problems are not in principle greater than 
 
2 Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992), vii. See also pp. 96-101.  
3 Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics 
of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 60. 
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those encountered by any liberal society that has to combine, for example, liberty and 
equality, or prosperity and justice.4 
The move here is to emphasize "respecting diversity" in the face of divergent goals, 
and the protection of "fundamental rights" which allow these different objectives to be 
pursued in the same society. 
 
II. Charles Taylor’s Ontology of the Self 
Despite his denials, Taylor may very well be the only multiculturalist with  an ontology 
of sorts. Among the three other ‘horsemen’ – Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer, and 
Alasdair MacIntyre – only MacIntyre, in his later stage, starting from Dependent Rational 
Animals, has something comparable to Taylor’s ontology.5 
Taylor’s seminal work The Sources of the Self has as its starting point an analysis of 
language. For Taylor, the notion of an "ego" or "self" as a responsible human being 
implies the faculty to desire as well as the capacity to discriminate between the wishes 
held in common with other animals and specifically human desire – that is, the desires 
oriented by our evaluation of them as really desirable or undesirable.  
Some human desires are evaluated in such a way that they are rank-ordered as lower 
or higher, as virtuous or vicious, noble or vulgar, profound or superficial; so humans act as 
moral beings by exercising that capacity to make a "strong evaluation" about the real 
worth and dignity of those desires. 
The use of this capacity is the background scheme of our moral reactions or intuitions. 
As Taylor states in a preliminary conclusion in The Sources of the Self,  
So our moral reactions in this domain have two facets, as it were. On one side, 
they are almost like instincts, comparable to our love of sweet things, or our 
aversion to nauseous substances, or our fear of falling; on the other, they 
seem to involve claims, implicit or explicit, about the nature and status of 
 
4 Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" p. 59. 
5 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals (Chicago and LaSalle: Open Court, 
1999), pp. ix-x. 
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human beings. From this second side, a moral reaction is an assent to, an 
affirmation of, a given ontology of the human.6 
In other words, moral reactions or intuitions are characteristically "instinctive", as 
well as characteristically driven in the direction of certain ontological claims about what it 
is to be human. And as "strong evaluators", we have a language rich enough to articulate 
especially the second of these two "facets" by means of different ontological 
justifications. 
[An ontological justification of this kind] tells us, for instance, that human 
beings are creatures of God and made in his image, or that they are immortal 
souls, or that they are all emanations of divine fire, or that they are all rational 
agents and thus have a dignity which transcends any other being, or some 
other such characterization; and that therefore we owe them respect. The 
various cultures which restrict this respect do so by denying the crucial 
description to those left outside: they are thought to lack souls, or to be not 
fully rational, or perhaps to be destined by God for some lower station, or 
something of the sort.7 
The Sources of the Self, as a whole, is an examination of different frameworks that 
present such ontological justifications of the self and its sources along three axes:8 (1) 
views about our relationships with others; (2) a conception of the good life for all human 
beings; (3) the idea of our own dignity and status as human beings. 
It is important to remark that, for Taylor, the self’s identity is not just what we happen 
to think about ourselves – a reductive thesis which would allow us to dispense with what 
Taylor takes as an inclination of moral reactions to form ontological judgments – but 
depends on a web of various non-arbitrary conceptions active even in ordinary life: 
I want to defend the strong thesis that doing without frameworks is utterly 
impossible for us; otherwise put, that the horizons within which we live our 
lives and which make sense of them have to include these strong qualitative 
discriminations.9 
 
6 Charles Taylor, The Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 
p. 5. 
7 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 5. 
8 Cf. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 14ff. 
9 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 27. 
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To reject this "strong thesis" would be to disorient, to put the self out of "moral 
space."10 Humans are self-interpreting animals, and the language that we use to articulate 
our strong evaluations helps to define us. But language is only possible within a 
community, the self only exists among other selves, and it cannot be described without 
reference to others. 
This is the sense in which one cannot be a self on one's own. I am a self 
only in relation to certain interlocutors: in one way in relation to those 
conversation partners who were essential to my achieving self-definition; in 
another in relation to those who are now crucial to my continuing grasp of 
languages of self-understanding-and, of course, these classes may overlap. A 
self exists only within what I call ‘webs of interlocution’.11 
The crucial feature of human life is that it is dialogical, that is, identity is defined 
through the interaction with others whom we consider to be significant others. I am a self, 
a strong evaluator, and those strong evaluations shape me, but all of this presupposes 
‘webs of interlocution’ which extend beyond my own self. Thus, in "The Politics of 
Recognition", Taylor emphasizes that: 
…. discovering my own identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation, but 
that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others. 
That is why the development of an ideal of inwardly generated identity gives a 
new importance to recognition. My own identity crucially depends on my 
dialogical relations with others.12 
 
What Taylor calls the "naturalist temper", a "reductive thesis" in the sense above 
which tries do without strong evaluations and to keep simply to our moral reactions and 
actions, is thus pitted against his notion of ‘webs of interlocution,’ which are supposed to 
be crucial features of human life.  
 
III. The Good, the Self, and the Just 
 
10 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 28. 
11 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 36. 
12 Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", p.  34. 
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We may take this opposition as the analogue to the usual liberal-"communitarian" 
point of demarcation, that is, the question of the priority of the good.13 
This "naturalist temper" thus includes utilitarianism, which abandons all qualitative 
distinctions and reduces the self to a subject of calculated (or calculable) action, as well as 
Kantian constructivism, which takes as irrelevant any distinctions based on the cosmic 
order or ordinary human nature.14 What has moral value in either case is what is implied 
by the principles of duty, without any substantive considerations of the good – or, that it 
unwittingly conceals those substantive considerations in the first place – thus rendering 
them characteristically universal and non-substantive. 
Morality is narrowly concerned with what we ought to do, and not also with 
what is valuable in itself, or what we should admire or love. Contemporary 
philosophers, even when they descend from Kant rather than Bentham (e.g., 
John Rawls), share this focus. (…) [Moral philosophy’s] starting point should be 
our intuitions about what actions are right (Rawls), or some general theory 
about what morality is, conceived in prescriptive, i.e., action-guiding, terms 
(Hare).15 
 
Now, Rawls’ "thin theory of the good"asserts the priority of the just over the good,16 
and as this is the usual point of demarcation between liberals and "communitarians", it is 
necessary for finding Taylor’s functionally equivalent place. Although Rawls’ thin 
conception is useful to fight shallow utilitarianism, wielding such a prioritization as a 
benchmark may result in the deprecation of any conception of the good.  Quoting Taylor: 
Where ‘good’ means the primary goal of a consequentialist theory, where the 
right is decided simply by its instrumental significance for this end, then we 
ought indeed to insist that the right can be primary to the good. But where we 
use ‘good’ in the sense of this discussion, where it means whatever is marked 
out as higher by a qualitative distinction, then we could say that the reverse is 
the case, that in a sense, the good is always primary to the right. Not in that it 
 
13 Fergus Kerr, "The Self and the Good: Taylor’s Moral Ontology," in Ruth Abbey (ed.), 
Charles Taylor, pp. 84-104. 
14 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 22ff. 
15 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 84. 
16 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999) p. 347ff [§60]. 
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offers a more basic reason in the sense of our earlier discussion, but in that the 
good is what, in its articulation, gives the point of the rules which define the 
right.17 
 
So, again, there is a sense in which Taylor finds Rawls’ thin conception correct, i.e. in 
opposition to consequentialism. But, again, this is characteristically non-substantive. This 
thin liberalism gives full priority to individual rights as the basis for organizing society, and 
this prioritization affords such a universal political outlook. However, this prioritization 
neglects what is usually and even sometimes correctly called "the common good"– good 
precisely in its being commonly shared, commonly good. 
Rawls himself tries to identify some primary goods, among which, along with income 
and wealth, he includes the social bases of self-respect. But he privatizes a rank of goods 
whose essential value implies sharing and which, on Taylor’s analysis, is dialogically 
constituted – such as a joke told to a group, a public performance of an orchestra, or 
French conversation in Québec.  
Taylor narrates a history beginning with the loss of social hierarchies, which were the 
basis for honorific and unequal social structures, and ending with the universalist and 
egalitarian notion of dignity.18 "With the move from honor to dignity", writes Taylor in 
Multiculturalism, "has come a politics of universalism, emphasizing the equal dignity of all 
citizens, and the content of this politics has been the equalization of rights and 
entitlements. "19  
It seems, therefore, that Taylor would qualify as a liberal of sorts, despite a great deal 
of disagreement about what exactly liberalism beyond some vague references to freedom 
or individual autonomy. But, as Adam Swift comments, "The problem is that both 
‘liberalism’ and ‘communitarianism’ mean different things to different people. "20 
 
17  Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 89. 
18 Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition " p. 26ff. 
19 Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" p. 37. 
20 Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992), viii. See an attempt at characterizing “communitarianism” in pp. ix-xii. 
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IV. "The Spectre of Communitarianism" 
Whereas the previous influential and important critiques of the excesses of liberalism 
came from Marxism, as Alasdair MacIntyre suggested in a 1993 joint review of Daniel 
Bell’s Communitarianism and its Critics and Stephen Holmes’ The Anatomy of 
Antiliberalism, many of the best critiques against certain deep-seated excesses of 
liberalism are now levied by very different philosophers who have received the common 
name of  "communitarians" (or some near-cognate, such as "anti-liberals "). 
 The "communitarians" have frequently rejected the label, however, and MacIntyre 
explains that he, Christopher Lasch21 and Roberto Unger22 – three "communitarian" 
targets in Holmes’ book – cannot be targets of the fantasy collective of Holmes’ invention. 
Actually, critiques of "communitarianism" had by then become fairly widespread, as 
though it were a new "spectre" and haunting, not Europe, but academia: not a unified 
Marxist or communist resistance, but a unified "communitarian" resistance.23 
There seems to be a disjunction between the scale of the liberal reaction and the 
actual opposition of the critics. In connection with Bell’s piece, MacIntyre notes how much 
similarity there is even between liberalism and Bell’s (explicit) communitarianism, where 
the latter is "anxious to accommodate liberal concerns" and "[correct] liberal 
principles."24 Even Holmes admits that those such as MacIntyre are actually "soft anti-
liberals" who "malign liberalism verbally, but when faced with practical choices, reveal a 
surprising fondness for liberal protections and freedoms."25  
If the criticism from the (only sometimes acerbic) liberal side should in substance 
amount to, not an alert of a reinvention of totalizing politics from pre-1945 – being 
 
21 Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 134. 
22 Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, p. 162. 
23 Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Spectre of Communitarianism", Radical Philosophy 70. 
(March/April 1995): pp. 34-35. 
24 Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Spectre of Communitarianism", p.  35. 
25 Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, p. 88. 
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instead a more quasi-benign anti-universalism, to abuse Brian Barry’s words even out of 
context26 – but a "deeply unrealistic and utopian" alternative to liberalism, as MacIntyre 
characterizes the would-be criticism; if at least something like this is the case, one might 
expect "communitarianism" to simply be ignored, almost how Barry remarks that "within 
academia [Marxism] has lost ground to the point at which it is not even attacked any 
more, let alone defended." 27 
Instead, "communitarians" receive "spluttering outrage" in books such as Holmes’ – a 
spluttering apparently endorsed by distinguished liberal theorists, if the book cover 
endorsements are supposed to mean anything. (In the edition MacIntyre was reviewing,28 
Richard Posner had written that Holmes’ targets have, at least as a collective, "roots" in 
the same "soil" as Fascism; this is seemingly unwarranted even if we dispel the word 
"blood" from mind.)29  
Why then are many liberal theorists bent on turning "communitarians" or "anti-
liberals" into a school of thought, and a dangerous one at that? Or, put differently, "why is 
contemporary liberal theorizing thus haunted by phantoms?" asks MacIntyre. "Here" he 
continues, "I can make only a suggestion": 
Is it that such [liberal] theorizing is now informed by an imperfectly suppressed 
consciousness of its own irrelevance? In liberal periodicals and among 
university teachers the battles of the concepts proceed, with liberals 
continually announcing victories over some new set of enemies or dissidents. 
But in the social and political order at large the ugly realities of money and 
power are increasingly badly masked by the games played with the concepts of 
utility, rights and contract. The spectre haunting contemporary liberal 
theorists is not communitarianism, but their own irrelevance.30 
 
26 Cf. Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 5. 
27 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 3. 
28 Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, 1st ed., (Cambridge, MA and London: 
Harvard University Press, 1993). Posner’s remark is apparently absent from the Revised 
Edition. 
29 A displeased MacIntyre comments: "[A]s Richard A. Posner puts it in his dust jacket 
endorsement, [Holmes’ book] ‘exposes [these antiliberals’] roots in the soil that nourished 
Fascism’. The implied history is even more dubious than the arguments." Alasdair 
MacIntyre, "The Spectre of Communitarianism", p. 35. 
30 Alasdair MacIntyre, Idem, "The Spectre of Communitarianism", p. 35. 
Identity and the Need for Recognition: The Ontological and Political Specter 
of Communitarianism according to MacIntyre and Barry, Anthony Vecchio 
 
Gaudium Sciendi, Nº 19, Dezembro 2020                                                                               133 
  
MacIntyre does not have Barry in mind, at least not in the way he has Holmes and 
Posner in mind (spewing as they do "liberal agitprop"31), but perhaps it is "the games 
played with the concepts of utility, rights, and contract" masking "the ugly realities of 
money and power" which MacIntyre would take Barry’s anti-particularism to be 
defending as well, effectively. 
Where does multiculturalism fit into a debate about the "spectre of 
communitarianism"? Insofar as misapplied "communitarianism" is a specter of liberal 
theorists’ imagination, we might expect that liberalism is irrelevant in some way, that it 
fails to be effective where it aspires to be effective – and that the variety of outside 
complaints, including those of multiculturalists, seem like a more or less unified 
resistance.32 
Both "communitarianism" and multiculturalism would fall under the rubric of quasi-
benign anti-universalism, to continue to abuse Barry’s words. There are those, such as Will 
Kymlicka, who have insisted upon a multicultural liberalism – to which we will turn in the 
penultimate section – and whom liberals such as Barry denounce. But the haunt of liberal 
academia, to whatever extent it is a void left by Marxism, is possibly also a void left by a 
liberalism bearing too much in common with a dead enemy. "[T]he anti-liberal rhetoric of 
multiculturalists," Barry remarks somewhat tellingly, "is not uncongenial to the 
reactionary right. Thus, exponents of the ‘politics of difference’ typically inveigh against 
the ‘abstract universalism’ that they attribute to liberalism."33 
 
V. Losing Our Way in Post-Marxist Territory 
Another mention of the specter haunting liberalism comes, paradoxically, from very 
different quarters. Brian Barry begins his book Culture and Equality with Marx’s famous 
 
31 Alasdair MacIntyre, Ibidem, "The Spectre of Communitarianism,"p.  35. 
32 Although Barry does not find there to be a single "Enlightenment project" in any 
positive sense, he does find there to be a curiously unified anti-Enlightenment resistance 
from the left and from the right. Again, he does not use the term "communitarian. See 
Culture and Equality, 9ff, esp. p. 16. 
33 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 11. 
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sentence: "A spectre is haunting Europe…" The specter is no longer communism, but "the 
politics of difference, the politics of recognition or, most popularly, multiculturalism."34  
It has been a long time since communism has haunted Europe, but a specter haunts 
Europe nonetheless: The void left by communism and academic Marxism, which is now 
filled by tendencies of nationalist or ethnic "self-assertion" as well as poverty in the wake 
of destroyed command economies.35 There is a corresponding situation in academia.36 
According to Barry, Marxism agreed with other modern projects in that it proposed 
itself as universally applicable. Especially insofar as liberalism used to fill the role of 
countering academic Marxism, it tried to match that Marxism in its universality.37 With 
the decline of academic Marxism, and as some dogmatically universalizing tendencies in 
liberalism were recognized and abandoned, this has seemed to leave liberal theorists 
without a clear picture about the future of an international liberal community. 
It is not inevitable that political situations tend today in the direction of 
"particularism" – nationalist or ethno-culturalist, or something more nonthreatening.38 
What matters in crucial part is the ideas in circulation, and in this respect the continuing 
development of arguments in favor of an international liberal community cannot simply 
be ignored. Nor should the history of those ideas; it was the anti-particularism of post-war 
liberalism, as famously expressed in the landmark Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948, which has served as a touchstone in the development of an international 
liberalism. 
There are importance differences between liberalism with post-war aspirations, 
however developed since then, and what has come to be called "the politics of 
recognition" or "multiculturalism", which has, curiously, evolved alongside the 
development of the post-war international community. Multiculturalism has some 
overlap with the nationalist and ethnocentrist particularism, which Barry denounces as a 
 
34 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 5. 
35 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 3. 
36 Cf. Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 3-4. 
37 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 4. 
38 Cf. Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 4-5. 
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step backwards. Multiculturalism is a far more unproblematic particularism, he assures us, 
but this does not dissipate the anxiety: 
My concern is with views that support the politicization of group identities, 
where the basis of the common identity is claimed to be cultural. (…) Those 
who advocate the politicization of (cultural) group identities start from a 
variety of premises and finish up with a variety of policy prescriptions. 
Nevertheless, there is enough overlap between [multiculturalism and 
nationalist or ethnocentrist particularism] to make it feasible to discuss them 
within a single book.39 
 
More generally, in the West, political thinkers seem decreasingly sure of the universal 
efficacy of liberal ideas. Some of these "anti-universalistic" but "benign" thinkers have 
merited (but not by Barry) the label "communitarian" if we can take             
"communitarianism " to signify a set of at least loosely connected positions. Neither the " 
communitarian" thinkers nor " communitarianism" would be free of Barry’s particularist 
charge, whatever the case. Even so, there might be a different meaning to 
"communitarianism", which is revelatory about the development of multiculturalism and 
its relationship to liberalism. 
 
VI. Ontological and Political Differences 
Taylor qualifies Rawls’ priority of the just over the good; the MacIntyre of After Virtue 
believes Rawls’ and Nozick’s defense of liberal ideas to be incommensurable, and points 
to their shallow ideas of the good life. But they could hardly be qualified as upholding the 
case of moral particularism (as, for example, Bernard Williams). But both Taylor and 
MacIntyre think there is an unresolved tension between Rawls’ and Nozick’s ideas, and 
what they consider the excesses of certain kinds of liberalism.  
Brian Barry goes further and thinks that most communitarians and the politics of 
recognition simply depart from the Enlightenment idea of universal morality and are truly 
incompatible with liberalism. Will Kymlicka thinks, on the contrary, that there is no 
 
39 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 5. 
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contradiction between the politics of recognition and "group-differentiated rights" 40 and 
liberal ideas. He argues that liberals need to endorse group rights.  
Surely, Kymlicka acknowledges that, as more and more national groups "mobilize and 
assert their identity" and the rules of political life are challenged by the new politics of 
cultural difference that, for instance, outrage Brian Barry, are gathering support within 
academia.41 However, while many people see this politics of difference as a threat to 
liberalism, Kymlicka presents a more optimistic view, trying to show that many demands 
of cultural or ethnic groups are consistent with the liberal principles of individual freedom 
and social justice. 
He does not try to solve the baseline difficulties with liberalism and anti-liberal 
cultural or ethnic groups. Instead, he looks to show that they can be "managed", so to say. 
He acknowledges that there is hatred, segregation, pogroms, and genocide, and that given 
these abuses, many people feel a strong temptation "to push aside the very idea of 
minority rights." In his opinion, that response is misguided, but not owing to the 
impoverishment of a naturalistic temper. In many cases, more individualism would 
actually dissolve many conflicts. Kymlicka’s point is that political life has an inescapably 
national dimension, whether it is in the drawing of boundaries and distributing of powers, 
or in decisions about the language of schooling, courts, and bureaucracies, or in the choice 
of public holidays. Moreover, these inescapable aspects of political life give a profound 
advantage to the members of majority nations.42 
Kymlicka suggests some practical steps. Ethnic groups and other disadvantaged groups 
should be accommodated by polyethnic and representation rights or, in certain cases, 
minorities should receive self-government rights within majority nations. But he also 
asserts that there are two constraints on any conception of minority rights. The first, an 
external constraint, is that a group should not be allowed to oppress other groups. The 
second, an external constraint, is that a group should not be able to oppress its own 
 
40 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 26. 
See Ch. 5. 
41 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 93. 
42 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 194 
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members. "Within these limits" he insists" minority rights can play a valuable role within 
a broader theory of liberal justice. Indeed, they must play a role if liberalism is not to be 
condemned to irrelevance in many parts of the world."43 
Indeed, Kymlicka thinks that the future of a just liberalism integrally involves minority 
rights. "Without such measures" he says, "talk of ‘treating people as individuals’ is itself 
just a cover for ethnic and national injustice. "44 
Thus, Kymlicka ultimately determines that the liberal principles of justice are 
consistent and indeed require certain forms of special status for minorities. Some of these 
minorities may be illiberal. But liberals do not have an automatic right to impose their 
(liberals’) views – only a responsibility to identify what those views are. In his opinion, the 
questions on how to deal with illiberal cultures are not specific to minority cultures. There 
are many illiberal majority cultures, and many liberal homogeneous nation states. The 
liberality of a culture is a matter of degree. 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
We tend to agree with MacIntyre that there seems to be a disjunction between the 
scale of the liberal reaction and the actual opposition of the critics, but we assert 
nonetheless that we should not minimize the differences. In fact, Will Kymlicka’s easy 
pragmatic solution may turn out to be more intrusive than a sheer liberal view, because 
we cannot simply dispel entirely all conceptions of the good – and there is indeed a strong 
difference about the status of the recognition of human dignity that is both metaphysical 
and political.    
Charles Taylor asserts that from his ontological view no concrete political stances 
necessarily follow. And MacIntyre has a diagnostic of our dystopian moral situation but 
does not really have a political proposal at all. However, it is surely surprising that the four 
"communitarian" horsemen tend to describe themselves as: "I’m not a communitarian, 
 
43 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 194. 
44 Regarding immigration, Kymlicka does not think it is wrong for a liberal state "to insist 
that immigration entails accepting the legitimacy of state enforcement of liberal 
principles, so long as immigrants know this in advance, and none the less voluntarily 
choose to come." 
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but…" Both the specter of communitarianism and the crises of liberalism have flesh and 
bones. To the extent that all of them consider that a substantive conception of the good 
always necessarily underlies any idea of justice or procedures in public life, that is why 
they deny that moral value can be defined without any substantive considerations of the 
good. Often, universalist liberalism just conceals its own substantive considerations (let us 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we will start from a distinction established by Charles Taylor between 
the metaphysics of the self as a dialogical being and the politics of recognition. With this 
distinction in mind, we inquire why (1) most so-called communitarians are often 
uncomfortable with the epithet, and (2) why the "specter" of "the politics of recognition" 
(Barry) or the "spectre of communitarianism" (MacIntyre) seem to be a threat to impartial 
liberal rights. We tend to agree with MacIntyre that there seems to be a disjunction 
between the scale of the liberal reaction and the actual opposition of the critics, but we 
assert nonetheless that we should not minimize the differences. In fact, Will Kymlicka’s 
easy pragmatic solution may turn out to be more intrusive than a sheer liberal view, 
because we cannot simply dispel entirely all conceptions of the good and there is indeed a 
strong difference about the status of the recognition of human dignity that is both 
metaphysical and political. Both the specter of communitarianism and the crises of 
liberalism have flesh and bones. 
Keywords:  Politics of recognition; communitarianism; liberal rights, universalism. 
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RESUMO 
Neste artigo, partiremos de uma distinção estabelecida por Charles Taylor entre a 
metafísica do eu como ser dialógico e a política de reconhecimento. Com essa distinção 
em mente, perguntamo-nos, primeiro, por que motivo a maioria dos chamados 
"comunitaristas" muitas vezes se incomoda com o epíteto e, em segundo lugar, por que o 
"espectro" da "política de reconhecimento" (Brian Barry) ou o "espectro do 
comunitarismo" (Alasdair MacIntyre) parece ser uma ameaça aos direitos liberais 
imparciais.  Tendemos a concordar com MacIntyre que parece haver uma disjunção entre 
a amplitude da reacção liberal aos comunitaristas e a oposição real dos críticos do 
liberalismo, mas afirmamos, no entanto, que não devemos minimizar as diferenças. Na 
verdade, a solução pragmática fácil de Will Kymlicka pode acabar sendo mais intrusiva do 
que uma visão liberal pura, porque não podemos simplesmente dissipar todas as 
concepções do bem nem da esfera privada, nem da esfera pública e há, de facto, uma 
forte diferença sobre o estatuto do reconhecimento da dignidade humana que é tanto 
metafísica como política. Tanto o espectro do comunitarismo como a crise do liberalismo 
têm carne e ossos e não são meras fantasias e conclui que há uma forte diferença sobre o 
estatuto do reconhecimento da dignidade humana que é tanto metafísica como política. 
 
